Here is a wonderful audio illusion. Listen first while watching it, then listen to it again with your eyes closed. Most people hear a different syllable the second time.

And for a wonderful way your eyes can be tricked, try this awareness test:

The evidence of our senses needs to be checked and doublechecked before we rely on it. Lots of people see or feel something once, and think it’s a supernatural experience, but then can’t reproduce it. That’s not something I’d want to base a belief system on.

The reason why I trust my sense of touch is that it yields internally consistent information about the purported physical reality. Another reason is that it yields information which is consistent with the sense of vision.

Tactile illusions exist.

Beware the reliability of your senses; your perceived reality is interpreted rather than a “raw” feed.

The thing that is unconvincing about naturalism to me is precisely the same thing that you claim is unconvincing about my position: selective skepticism. You ask.

how can you figure out if something is real if you cannot physically experience it? If it is something like the “warm fuzzies,” can you ever really be sure that it is real,

I would ask: How can you figure out if something is real if you touch it? How can you be sure?

The reason why I trust my sense of touch is that it yields internally consistent information about the purported physical reality. Another reason is that it yields information which is consistent with the sense of vision.
But what I do not do, is simply presuppose that the sense of touch is to be trusted.

Similarly with a “sixth sense”, testimonies, etc. about the non-physical reality (and physical reality). I do not simply pre-suppose that these methods are not to be trusted. Rather, those ways of getting “in touch” with a purported reality are so widespread that they are initially to be taken seriously. But only initially: They have to pass the same tests as for example the sense of touch. That is: Do they yield consistent information about the reality they claim to describe?

So, it is rather one-sided skepticism if one is only skeptical about mystical experiences, predictive powers of dreams, intuitive knowledge, biblical testimony, warmfuzzy feelings, fortunetelling, etc. but is not skeptical about physical experiences. A balanced skepticism takes all of these ways of approaching purported reality initially as serious possibilities (given that they are practiced) but then checks them against each other.

I am not at all trying to convert you or something. Rather, I am interested in whether I actually can find plausible alternatives to religion. And, current currents of naturalism simply didn’t convince me yet.

(btw, your thoughts on how we know about math and logic seem sound. Thanks for that. I am not convinced yet. But it is a nice theory you present).

To be honest, I don’t know all that much about Deism either – I don’t think I know any in person. However, I’ve often encountered references to it as a haven for those who cannot not believe in God yet reject Revelation and unreason.

Here’s the introductory paragraph on Deism from Wikipedia:
“Deism is the belief that God exists and created the physical universe, but does not interfere with it. It is related to a religious philosophy and movement that derives the existence and nature of God from reason. It takes no position on what God may do outside the universe.”…”Deists typically reject most supernatural events (prophecy, miracles) and tend to assert that God does not intervene with the affairs of human life and the natural laws of the universe. What organized religions see as divine revelation and holy books, most deists see as interpretations made by other humans, rather than as authoritative sources. Deists believe that God’s greatest gift to humanity is not religion, but the ability to reason.”

In relation to this discussion, I think that, since the Deist God is not a personal one, it can only really be said to be irrational because of the presupposition that a Creator must exist. Other than that, there’s (so far as I understand it) no reason why a Deist should not, in general, be as rational as any atheist.

PS I posed my question as I did on the assumption that you’d considered Deism as a candidate for a rational faith, and dismissed it. It’s theistic, it’s a faith, and I think a candidate (presupposition aside) to be considered as a “rational faith”.

Gary, how does Deism not meet your criteria for a “reasonable faith”?

I am not sufficiently aware of Deism to comment on it. Is the faith of the deist anything like the faith of the theist? I see this argument as specifically about the problems with the influence of theistic belief systems on the world. How do you see Deism in relation to this discussion?

What a dilemma! Thoughtful critiques so often arent understood, yet slogans are oversimple. Whats a nontheist to do?…

Ive enjoyed our discussion. I hope we cross paths again!

Good hunting–

Much as I enjoy engaging you, I fear I’m kinda monopolizing this thread, so I’ll end with a couple of comments. (unless you want to bring another point up!

I think you’re quite right about glib and dismissive answers, and I justify my original comment by noting I’ve long ago given up writing detailed, thoughful and well-supported comments since so often they were either themselves glibly dismissed or more often just ignored. These days, I write a (hopefully pithy) comment and engage those who critiques it – I don’t just post and run.

Second, I note that, though I now think we in essence agree on all discussed points, we were disputatious in the process of establishing that.

More evidence that atheists have no shared dogma.

If what you’re now saying is that you really were referring to explanatory inference, then we are in closer agreement, for I think that is much more solid grounds for rejecting theism — i.e., God is a poor explanation for much of anything. My reponse had been occasioned by the (perhaps mis-) impression that you were attempting to rule the whole question a nonstarter for definitional reasons, which, for reasons I explained (and by the examples I gave), I disagree with.

2. No, not proof. Evidence for, perhaps, but not proof by any means. God, in that case, would become the (or at least *a*)explanatory inference for the efficacy of such prayer, but certainly not a deductive inference from it.

3. Exceedingly feeble indeed! I couldnt say it better myself and no one who is not already inclined to be convinced would consider that a successful argument. So feeble, yes, *incoherent*, no.

4. “It seems to me it’s equivalent to trying to rationally disprove the inference that “An omnipotent, omniscient God could have created* a reality with no Evil in it”"

The “could” part is agreed upon*. Whether that “could” implies a “would” is another question. Not being omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent myself, its hard for me to say. A god, it has been argued (not by me) might have reasons even more compelling than the reduction of this-worldly suffering to allow such suffering. Again, this is not *my* argument — this is the argument of real-world theologians, so this is what we would have to address.

5. “Why do you appear to grant Theodicy credibility?” I dont, and I agree with your assessment of apologetics, and I would add my own qualifier “psychologically disingenuous”.

But I dont think we do ourselves as nonbelievers any favors by giving off-the-mark and dismissive answers. We wont convince anyone to reconsider his illusions by saying his argument is incoherent and self-contradictory when it isnt. Any believer whos paying attention will see through that, and eat our lunch. We will have more impact, I think, by giving fairer if, perhaps, somewhat less potent rebuttals. Theodicy is not really incoherent, per se, but it *does* require a needlessly complex set of assumptions and logical gerrymandering to make it work. It can be done — (“okay, fine, congratulations”) — but isnt it just simpler to say there appears to be no God because there *is* no God? Thats the better answer for apologists, is my contention.

* Mostly. Is it really clear that an omni-being *could* create free willed beings that *would* never commit evil? I dont know. I think the problem is that we really dont know what “infinite power” really means (nor “free will” for that matter), so who could say what its consequences would be?